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JURISPRUDENCE
MORAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
TAX PRACTICE
To deny that the duty to pay taxes creates many serious motal
problems is to imply that there is a double standard of morality-one
for paying taxes and another for governing the rest of life. Is it
unusual to find a man who would not even think of cheating in business,
but who gloats over the amount of undeclared income he receives or the
number of unauthorized deductions he takes?
However, we cannot condemn the taxpayer too strenuously for he
comes by his attitude honestly. History shows that the tax collector
under our original laissez faire theory of government was regarded as
an intruder.1 One of the motives of ihe American Revolution was the
abolition of excessive taxation. The rugged individualists of early
American history manifested a great abhorrence of taxes in any form
and though admitting that taxes were necessary to maintain the govern-
ment, they strove to keep the levy at a minimum. This attitude is evi-
denced by the fact that, although the taxing power is inherently implied
in sovereign existence, it is specifically "granted" to the legislative
body in the United States Constitution.2 The fact that there are at least
five limitations upon the federal power to tax in the United States
Constitution and at least ten limitations upon the taxing powers of the
states emphasizes this attitude. 3 The courts also promulgated this atti-
tude in the past by placing the burden of proving tax liability squarely
on the government and allowing the citizen to use any sort of device to
evade the tax so long as he adhered to the mere form of legality, thus
staying within the letter of the law.4 That is not the attitude of the
courts today. Since the advent of the direct tax on income,5 taxes are no
longer looked upon as mere nuisances, the avoidance of which would
give little or no advantage over others. Today, tax evasion gives a great
advantage to the evader over the competitor who faithfully and con-
scientiously pays his taxes. For this reason, if for no other, the courts
have looked beyond the mere legal form to the substance of the trans-
action to see whether, in point of fact, a taxable event actually
occurred.6
IMiller, Morality in Tax Planning, 10 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION
1067 (1952).
2 ANDERSON, TAXATION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 21 (1951).
3 SCHULTZ AND HARRIS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE 172-178 (1949).
4 U.S. v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496 (U.S. 1873).
5 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XVI.
6 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940) ; Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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The more fundamental reason for the modern juridical attitude
toward would-be tax evaders seems to be the cognizance which the
courts have taken of the basic and immutable natural law concept that
each citizen in a society must bear a fair share of the burden of main-
taining the common well-being of society; in short, every person
should carry his fair share of the tax burden.7
It is not a difficult process of reasoning by which we arrive at this
basic natural law concept. Since man is by nature a social animal, i.e.,
destined to live in a political society; and since a political society cannot
exist without a principle of authority whose purpose is to direct citizens
to the end for which a political society exists, i.e., the common good of
all, and since man derives benefits from his membership in a political
society, he has the obligation of contributing his proportionate share to
the common well-being of the whole community. Since the common
good is promoted by the revenue received from taxes, it follows that
every person has the duty to carry his fair share of the tax burden.
Finally, since the means whereby a government (which is. the principle
of authority) directs citizens to the common good are laws, we arrive
at the basic natural law principle that the just laws of legitimate
authority are to be obeyed.8
Granting the validity of these basic principles, there arise two
specific and practical questions: How do we determine whether a law is
just? Must an unjust law be obeyed?
On the part of government, the legislators, in enacting any law, must
be guided by the standards of distributive justice which is that species
of justice which inclines the wills of the rulers to confer benefits, and
impose burdens on the citizens in just proportion. Just as the citizen
owes his proportionate contribution to the common good, so the state
has a reciprocal obligation to the citizens. The citizen, precisely as a
citizen, has a right, by natural law, to demand of the state or society
that he be assisted by society in attaining his end. Conversely, there
devolves upon the government the duty of providing, in just proportion,
opportunities for the moral, intellectual, and physical advancement of
the members of the society. This duty requires that the government
make a proportionate distribution of common advantages, and of com-
mon burdens. The distribution must be, according to the natural law,
governed by the needs, abilities, and merits of the citizens. 9
It follows then that a law which is not enacted in accordance with
these principles of distributive justice is unjust. However, an unjust
law is not solely on that account devoid of obligation. An unjust law is
devoid of obligation only if it prescribes an immoral action, such as,
7 MILLER, supra, note 1 at 1068.
8 SPAULDING, MORAL PHILOSOPHY 184-191 (1924).
9 RICKABY, MORAL PHILOSOPHY 102-108 (1929).
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assassination, adultery, or perjury. A tax law which agrees neither with
distributive justice nor with the principle of expenditure in the general
interest does not justify a person in defrauding the revenue. The
natural law principles of obedience and truthfulness take precedence.
It should be apparent that to give to the citizen such an uncontrolled
power to obey or disobey the law according to the individual's interpre-
tation of its justice or injustice would obviously lead to a chaotic society,
which would frustrate the very object of the society, the common good.
Thus, we see that a private citizen cannot morally justify his dis-
obedience of a tax law by deciding that it is not just. The proper
remedy is not disobedience but use of the means through which the
laws may be changed as provided by the Constitution.10
Having established these basic natural law concepts as being at the
foundation of the tax laws and as the source of the duty to pay taxes,
we turn next to moral and ethical considerations in particular tax
problems.
Probably there is nothing which is more obviously illegal than
deliberate fraud or misrepresentation. Moreover, there is probably
nothing more difficult to detect and prove, especially in the field of
taxation, than that the taxpayer or tax counselor is guilty of such
conduct. Not only is this charge difficult to prove when a particular
return is doubtful on its face, but due to the present method of auditing,
it is unlikely that in the great majority of cases, the return will ever be
questioned.""
This obvious inadequacy in the enforcement of the sanctions of the
tax laws makes it very evident that if true justice is to be attained, it
will be necessary to emphasize the fact that fraud is also contrary to
the natural law as not conforming to the truth, and thus bring into play
the moral sanction of a guilty conscience.
A few illustrations will make this clear. Suppose a taxpayer enters
your office in January, 1954 and says that he has just sold his boat and
realized a profit of $500. He has a non-deductible capital loss carry-
over from 1948, and he wants to know if he can offset his gain with that
loss. You tell him that he cannot since the gain was made in 1954 and
not in 1953, the last year in which his 1948 loss may be carried over.' 2
Should you suggest or agree to his suggestion that the contract of sale
be pre-dated December, 1953 in order to take advantage of the capital-
loss carry-over?
Pre-dating that contract is obviously fraud and yet everyone knows
that with the government three or four years behind in its auditing, the
fraud may never be discovered and therefore the sanctions of the tax
10 RoI iMN, THE NATURAL LAW 255-257 (1947).
11 BIc FoRD, SUCCESSFUL TAX PRAcricE 199 (1950).
"2 IxT. REV. CoDE §117 (e) (1).
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law may never be enforced. On the other hand, there can be no doubt
that whether the fraud is discovered by the government or not, such
pre-dating is immoral.
Now take the case of the taxpayer who wants you to "pad" his
deductions for business expenses away from home. Of course, here too
the fraud may never be discovered or challenged, but even if it is, you
have the added incentive that if you "pad" the deduction enough, a
compromise may be effected which will still be a fraud because it ex-
ceeds the actual amount that should have been deducted. 3 Here again,
the sanctions of the tax law are sadly inadequate, whereas a realization
that such conduct is contrary to the moral law would produce a con-
sciousness of guilt which could not be avoided by the rationalization
that the actions are permissible as long as they are not discovered.
Any thinking lawyer will agree that to perpetrate an obvious fraud
like the examples above, is neither legally nor morally justifiable. 1 4
However, a problem which will probably present no little practical
difficulty to the tax practitioner is the problem of whether there is a
duty of full and fair disclosure of a particular taxable transaction.
Assuming that such disclosure will not lead to criminal prosecution,
the question may be stated thus: Is the tax lawyer required to effect a
full and fair disclosure of all the material facts of a particular taxable
event? Generally, the answer to this question is "yes," but since there
are different reasons for that conclusion in different circumstances, the
reasons will be given in relation to the particular situation.
First, is there a duty of full disclosure at the original filing of the
return if the proper treatment of the event is questionable at law? The
moral principle to be applied here is that a man may not act with a
doubtful conscience, i.e., a man may not decide to do an act if he does
not know whether it is right or wrong. To do so is to say: "I don't
know whether this is morally right or not, but even if it is wrong, I
will do it." Thus, for the lawyer to act with a doubtful conscience is
morally wrong because he is, in effect, reasoning that he does not know
whether this act is in accord with the law or not, but even if it is not, he
will do it.'
Second, does the tax practitioner have this duty if he is certain that
the courts would be favorable to his client although the Internal
Revenue Bureau would not? Again, the answer is "yes" for to withhold
some of the pertinent facts or to color them so that they appear to be
what they are not is to misrepresent the true position of your client and
'3 Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners, 8 TAx L. REv. 1, (Nov. 1952).
U- The lawyer "must not be guilty of any fraudulent acts, and he must be free
from any unlawful conspiracy with either his client, the judge, or any other
person, which might have a tendency either to frustrate the administration ofjustice or to obtain for his client something to which he is not justly and
fairly entitled." Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 302 (1925).
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thus make him a party to an attempted fraud. No lawyer is morally
justified in participating in a fraud.'0 For him to do so violates both his
moral and professional duty.17
Finally, does the lawyer have the duty of full disclosure in a dispute
with the Bureau over the proper treatment of income or deductions?
From the foregoing principles, this question, too, must be answered in
the affirmative. It hardly seems open to doubt that a lawyer who fails to
disclose all of the pertinent facts in a dispute with the Bureau is guilty
of lying by omission, which conduct because it is intentional is fraud-
ulent and therefore immoral."8 If you agree that pre-dating a contract
and "padding" deductions are fraudulent, how is failure to disclose the
true nature of a transaction any less of a fraud?
There is still one further situation frequently arising in tax counsel-
ing which needs to be mentioned here. It is the moral duty of the tax
lawyer to exercise due diligence that he does not counsel a plan of "tax
evasion" under the guise of the term "tax avoidance." The distinction
between the two terms is fundamental and presents no serious problem
of definition.' 9
"Avoidance" connotes a course of action whereby a man may legally
avoid a particular taxable event by so arranging his affairs so as to avoid
the occurrence of that event. "Evasion" refers to a course of action
whereby a man avoids paying tax on a taxable event either by an ob-
viously illegal method or, more often, by arranging his affairs so that, in
form, no taxable event occurs, while in substance the apparent ar-
15 SPAULDING, supra, note 8, 55-74.
16 CANON 32, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, AmERICAN BAR
AssocIAnoN (1946). No lawyer should "render any service or advice in-
volving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are . . ." The lawyer
"advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his client
when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client
and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral
law."
17 CANON 15, supra. "The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the
client . . ." "But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust
of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the
law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of
him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane."
18 Opinion 131 at 281, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, supra.
"When controversies arise and claims are asserted, the interests of justice,
to the achievement of which the entire services of the Bar and Bench dedi-
cated, require that the truth in the field of fact as well as of law be ascertained
so far as is humanly possible."
"No lawyer should endeavor in any way, directly or indirectly, to prevent
the truth from being presented to the court in the event litigation arises."
10 "There is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low
as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody
owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands; taxes are enforced
exactions, not voluntary contributions." Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d
848 (1947). (Dissenting opinion by L. Hand.)
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ranging of affairs has not affected the occurrence of the taxable event
whatsoever.
20
It is obvious that the former is both legally and morally justifiable
while the latter is not. The lawyer, however, is presented with the
practical difficulty of ascertaining whether the plan he suggests is
actually one of legal tax avoidance or merely a legal label attached to a
tax evasion. 21 Because the problem is sometimes difficult to answer
from the available authorities, for the lawyer to exercise less than due
diligence before counseling a course of action is to breach his duty, both
moral and professional, to his client.22
From the foregoing statement of the basic natural law principles
which govern in the field of tax counseling, it is apparent that a very
great weight of moral responsibility rests upon the tax practitioner.
It is he, with his knowledge of the law and his knowledge of the facts
in the particular cases, who must make the initial moral decisions.
Although in most cases, the moral duty is clear, because of the in-
adequacy of the present system of tax auditing, it is apparent that the
lawyer may be seriously tempted to avoid that duty by one sort of
rationalization or another.
If the lawyer succumbs to these temptations, the effects are certain
to be far-reaching. Such weakness will not only affect his own char-
acter by lowering his own personal habits of integrity, but it will also
affect the attitude of society in general. Probably nothing has more
effect over the proper observance of law in a society than the conduct
of its lawyers, for the citizen properly reasons that if a certain type of
conduct is good enough for a lawyer, who purports to know the law, it
is good enough for the layman. Moreover, the low moral conduct of
one attorney should be of great concern to all attorneys, for it is common
knowledge that it takes very few such men to debase the reputation of
the entire profession.23 From a personal, social, and professional view-
20 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); U.S. v. Cumber-
land Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
21 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473
(1940) ; Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355 (1939).
22 "An attorney at law is an officer of the court. The nature of his obligations is
both public and private. His public duty consists in his obligation to aid the
administration of justice; his private duty, to faithfully, honestly, and con-
scientiously represent the interests of his client. In every case that comes to
him in his professional capacity he must determine wherein lies his obligations
to the public and his obligations to his client, and to discharge this. duty
properly requires the exercise of a keen discrimination; and wherever the
duties to his client conflict with those he owes to the public as an officer of
the court in the administration of justice, the former must yield to the
latter." Langen v. Borkowski, supra, note 14 at 301.
23 CANON 15, supra, note 16. "Nothing operates more certainly to create or to
foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the pro-
fession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs
to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up
by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the
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point then, the tax practitioner has the duty to inculcate into his pro-
fession and all of society a respect for the tax laws, for no matter what
are his feeling as to their economic or political wisdom, there can be no
doubt of the moral obligation to obey them.
0. MICHAEL BONAHOOM
duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning
his client's cause."
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